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This paper examines the usefulness of considering monetary aggregates
when assessing monetary policy stance, and contrasts monetary analysis to the
current mainstream monetary policy analysis. Monetary developments, unlike
interest rate stance measures, are shown to provide quantitative information
on subsequent price levels. Moreover, ignoring money and focusing on interest
rates and real activity measures neglects crucial information as short-term ve-
locity movements are fully part of the monetary policy transmission process.
The analysis also sheds light on the recent change in inﬂation volatility and
persistence as well as on the Phillips curve ﬂattening. The empirical analysis
is based on US data since the 1960s as well as euro area and Swiss data since
the 1970s.
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11. INTRODUCTION
There is nowadays a large gap between mainstream monetary policy analysis and
policymakers’ concerns. Most models currently used for monetary policy analysis
or forecasting are linearized or normalized around an inﬂation steady-state or trend.
The implicit assumptions behind these models are that the central bank announces
an inﬂation target, the public believes in the intention and ability of policymakers to
reach this target, and that central bankers know how to optimally move a short-term
interest rate as a function of an unobservable frictionless real equilibrium interest rate
and of fundamental economic shocks in order to remain on that target and conduct
optimal cyclical policy. These “normalized” monetary policy analyses and estimations
are in fact focusing on inﬂation deviations from an exogenously given steady-state or
“trend inﬂation”.
In order to ﬁt the data, which are characterized by substantial and long-lasting
inﬂation swings, diﬀerent assumptions have been made regarding “trend inﬂation”.
Sometimes, a constant steady-state inﬂation is assumed, with major inﬂation ﬂuctu-
ations “explained” by “sunspot equilibria”. Sometimes, “trend inﬂation” is modeled
as an exogenous random walk or is identiﬁed as a model residual once some “struc-
tural” restrictions have been imposed on the data, and is interpreted as a moving
inﬂation target1. In empirical work, inﬂation is usually detrended, in a determinis-
tic or stochastic way. Analyses are thus trying to explain only one part of inﬂation
movements, which moreover have been decomposed in an arbitrary way. At the other
1See e.g. Cogley and Sbordone (2006) and Sbordonne (2006), where “trend inﬂation” is estimated
jointly with New Keynesian Phillips curve parameters in a VAR. Diﬀerent treatments of expectations,
i.e. subjective vs. rational, are applied to inﬂation trend vs. ﬂuctuations around trend. Sbordonne
(2006) shows that diﬀerent “trend inﬂation” assumptions have diﬀerent policy implications.
2extreme of assuming a constant steady-state inﬂation, every inﬂation movement could
be attributed to a change in policy target, and everything would be “explained”!
An implication of those analyses is that policymakers’ preferences can be expressed
in the form of a loss function: central banks in that world care about minimizing
inﬂation deviations around a given target and output deviations around its poten-
tial. Such a loss function has been explicitly derived from theoretical models (see
Woodford, 2003) and is extensively used in monetary analysis.
Such an analysis is at odds with policymakers concerns and behavior. First, the
main concern of central banks and of the population in general, and what matters for
welfare, is not small inﬂa t i o nd e v i a t i o n sa r o u n dag i v e ns t e a d y - s t a t eb u tr a t h e rad r i f t -
ing away from low inﬂation towards higher inﬂation or deﬂation. Whether inﬂation
is at 1.7 rather than 1.3 percent is not of much importance. Monetary policy cannot
ﬁne tune and control such small orders of magnitudes, and inﬂation is not perfectly
measured anyway. Nowadays, most central banks have, implicitly or explicitly, an
admissible range for inﬂation, and their concern is to prevent inﬂation from drifting
substantially and persistently above or below that range. The position of the inﬂation
r a t ew i t h i nt h a tr a n g ei sn o ti m p o r t a n ta sl o n ga si ti sa n di sf o r e c a s t e dt or e m a i n
in the desirable range. Figure 1 displays inﬂation data for the economies and sample
considered2.T h e i n ﬂation developments which need to be explained are: the high
inﬂation of the 1970s, the subsequent disinﬂation, the temporary inﬂation increase in
2Price series are the GDP price deﬂator for the US, the harmonized CPI for the euro area, and
the CPI for Switzerland. The samples considered, chosen according to availability of the data series
used in the analysis, are 1959Q1-2006Q2 for the US, 1973Q1-2005Q4 for the euro area, and 1975Q1-
2006Q4 for Switzerland. US data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database
and are released by the Federal Reserve Board, the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. Euro area data are from the European Central Bank and Eurostat. Swiss data
are from the Swiss National Bank and the Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce. All series except interest
rates are seasonally adjusted.
3the late 1980s / early 1990s, as well as the low and stable inﬂation thereafter. It is
c l a i m e dt h a t“ t r e n di n ﬂation” in New Keynesian models is determined by the mone-
tary policy inﬂation objective (see e.g. Woodford, 2006), but there is no evidence of
a correspondence between these two concepts, and section 2 of this paper shows that
there is no relationship between inﬂation objectives implicit in Taylor rules used to
“close” such models and observed inﬂation.
Furthermore, the identiﬁcation of macroeconomic shocks is diﬃcult. Even the most
obvious shock, a spike in oil prices, and its related “second round eﬀects” are not easy
to identify. Moreover, it is evident from recent policymakers’ public statements that
it is neither clear where the neutral interest rate is, nor how far one should be from it
in a given economic situation. Thus it is not clear how fast and how far beyond the
neutral rate central banks should go in a normalization period3. These considerations
are model dependent.
Monetary policymakers thus need to have some quantitative guidelines regarding
price developments after policy lags — which are one regularity documented in this
paper — have taken eﬀect, in order to avoid the substantial and long-lasting inﬂation
swings characterizing any country time series data. A wait-and-see approach carries
the risk of “being behind the curve” or, on the opposite, “overdoing it”. This paper
assesses the usefulness of monetary aggregates in providing these guidelines, and
contrasts monetary analysis to the current mainstream monetary policy analysis.
3For example, Thomas Hoenig, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, said that
“[m]onetary policy works with a lag, but it’s hard to appreciate that when you’re in the midst of the
cycle. [...] I’m still very much opposed to allowing inﬂation pressures to get out. I also, though [...]
want to be reasonable conﬁdent of not overshooting” (reported by The Wall Street Journal Europe,
May 22, 2006). Alan Blinder (Federal Open Market Committee Meeting Transcript, November 15,
1994) stated that “[t]he classic mistake of monetary policy [...] is overdoing it. [...] The classic
reason for this error [...] is impatience in waiting for the lagged eﬀects of what already has been
done”.
4In this paper I organize data in such a way as to characterize the relationship be-
tween money and price developments with some regularities that can be used to assess
monetary policy stance relative to an inﬂation objective as well as to interpret some
empirical results and address critiques and misconceptions regarding the usefulness
of monetary aggregates for monetary policy. Moreover, the analysis is used to shed
light on recent apparent changes in inﬂation dynamics. As argued by Orphanides
(2003), given our limited knowledge of economic dynamics and the resulting fact that
various models with diﬀerent implications for inﬂation dynamics coexist in the liter-
ature, evaluating stance measures based on historical macroeconomic developments
for practical monetary policy purposes requires an analysis that is not dependant on
speciﬁc models. In addition, the stylized facts presented in this paper suggest inherent
instability of reduced-form estimated inﬂation equations. Furthermore, as discussed
above, existing macroeconomic models that have tried to incorporate microeconomic
foundations are linearized around a given “trend inﬂation”, which is not appropriate
to address the issues of interest for this study.
The analysis of this paper thus imposes only a minimal structure on data, adjusting
for oﬀsetting inﬂuences of potential output and (the inverse of) equilibrium velocity
on money with respect to price developments, and characterizes the observed rela-
tionship between monetary and price developments, contrasting it to the information
contained in interest rate stance measures and to current inﬂation dynamics mod-
eling. This analysis is of course no substitute for structural model building, but it
provides stylized facts that structural models designed to model inﬂation dynamics
and address monetary policy issues should be able to replicate. The analysis shows
that monetary developments, unlike interest rate stance measures, provide qualitative
5and quantitative information on subsequent price levels and inﬂation developments.
Moreover, ignoring money and focusing on short-term interest rates and real activity
measures neglects crucial information with respect to the monetary policy transmis-
sion process and inﬂation dynamics.
It is commonly argued that the long-term relationship between money growth and
inﬂation comes only from a money demand relationship and is of no relevance for
the horizon of interest of central banks. It is also claimed that short-term velocity
movements due to implicitly accommodated money demand shocks — i.e. through an
interest rate based policy — or to monetary policy reacting to other fundamental eco-
nomic shocks blur the short-term relationship between money and prices, especially
in low inﬂation economies. It is further argued that, as a result, with a success-
ful inﬂation targeting strategy the link between money growth and inﬂation should
vanish. In contrast to those claims, this paper shows that when the relationship
between prices and money is characterized in a way that accounts for equilibrium
velocity changes and prices asymmetric behavior, we do not observe signiﬁcant mon-
etary developments that are not followed by corresponding price developments. Nor
do we observe signiﬁcant price movements not preceded by corresponding monetary
movements. Contrary to what is usually argued and modeled, what are considered
as velocity “shocks” provide information on subsequent price levels, pointing to a
weakness of models that represent policy actions with a short-term interest rate only.
Moreover, the quantitative importance of other economic shocks to inﬂation is small
in the samples considered. Consequently, a successful inﬂation targeting strategy
would result in a one-to-one relationship between money growth and inﬂation rates.
In summary, monetary developments can be used to characterize inﬂation trends
6as well as ﬂuctuations around these trends, and provide early information on these
inﬂation developments.
Monetary regularities are then used to shed light on recent changes in inﬂation pat-
terns and estimated relationships, i.e. on inﬂation reduced persistence and volatility
as well as on the ﬂattening of the Phillips curve. Moreover, the implications of the
leading information of velocity for estimation and forecasting using Phillips curves is
discussed.
In the analysis, I use data from the US, the euro area, and Switzerland. These
economies have had diﬀerent structures and policy regimes; the Federal Reserve has
ad u a lm a n d a t e ,w i t hn oe x p l i c i ti n ﬂation target, and has been confronted with very
diﬀerent inﬂation environments during the post-war period. The euro area is an ag-
gregation of individual countries with diﬀerent pre-euro policies and experiences. Fi-
nally, the Swiss National Bank had monetary targets till the end of the 1990s and has
been characterized as a precursor of the inﬂation targeting approach (see Bernanke,
1998). The Swiss case is also interesting as there have been several distinct inﬂation
environments even though average inﬂation has remained one of the lowest in the
world. The samples considered are thus from low inﬂation economies, with however
signiﬁcant changes in inﬂation environments and monetary policy responses. These
characteristics allow us to address critiques that the relationship between money and
inﬂation is weaker in lower inﬂation environments and depends on monetary policy
regimes.
Section 2 discusses weaknesses of interest rate policy stance measures and of interest
rate rules for monetary policy modeling; section 3 presents monetary regularities,
analyzes the usefulness of monetary stance measures as well as the role of short run
7velocity and output gaps in the monetary policy transmission process, and addresses
critiques with respect to the usefulness of monetary aggregates for monetary policy.
This monetary analysis is used in section 4 to shed light on recent changes in estimated
inﬂation dynamics, and section 5 concludes. Money demand estimates used in the
analysis are presented in the appendix.
2. INTEREST RATE STANCE MEASURES AND INFLATION
Current mainstream monetary policy analysis is done in terms of deviations around
an exogenously given inﬂation steady-state or trend. An optimal interest rate function
is derived, which generates the desired inﬂation deviations around steady-state or
trend, given the model considered. It has been shown that, given the implied loss
functions, simple Taylor rules, which were initially presented by Taylor (1993) as a
descriptive and organizing device for monetary policy decisions, can deliver close to
optimal results (see Woodford, 2003)4. These types of rules are also often used to
measure monetary policy stance, to represent monetary policy in forecasting models,
or to “close” New Keynesian models5.
The standard Taylor rule can be expressed as
i = r
∗ + π
∗ +1 .5(π − π
∗)+0 .5(y − y
∗), (1)
where i is a short-term nominal interest rate, r∗is the equilibrium real interest rate6,
4The optimal parametrization is however model dependent.
5For example, Woodford (2006, p.13), replying to Nelson (2003, sec. 2.2), states that “the trend
inﬂation rate is also determined within the system: it corresponds to the central bank’s target rate,
incorporated in the policy rule”.
6r∗ is not directly observable and has been subject to much discussion recently but is well ap-
proximated by a ﬁlter or sample average for practical purposes. My argument will not rely on a
precise estimate of r∗ as the potential ﬂuctuations of r∗ are relatively small compared to inﬂation
8π is the inﬂation rate, π∗ is the inﬂation objective of the central bank, y is (log) real
output and y∗ is (log) real potential output. The timing of variables diﬀers across
studies, which consider past, current or future deviations from steady-state or trend.
The transmission from the monetary policy instrument i to the inﬂation gap (π −
π∗)o p e r a t e sv i at h eo u t p u tg a p( y − y∗) in New-Keynesian models and depends on
each model’s speciﬁcations. The timing and amplitude of inﬂation deviations from
target then depend on optimally derived coeﬃcients of the interest rate equation (1),
although many analyses and forecasting exercises use ad hoc coeﬃcients, like the 1.5
and 0.5 values used here. The two last expressions, 1.5(π − π∗)+0 .5(y − y∗),a r e
thus implicitly the orders of magnitudes people refer to when they argue whether or
not a central bank should go above the equilibrium nominal interest rate (r∗ +π∗)i n
order to control future inﬂation/output gap developments as well as when the pace
of interest rate normalization is discussed.
The fact however is that a simple look at inﬂation time series, as e.g. in Figure
1, suggests that it does not make much sense to think of and characterize inﬂation
developments as deviations from a given steady-state. It seems even diﬃcult to think
in terms of underlying steady-state shifts, i.e. with level shifts characterizing speciﬁc
inﬂation regimes. What we observe and need to think about are protracted inﬂation
movements with strong amplitudes. After all, many econometric tests characterize
inﬂation as having a unit root. Models solved around a steady-state inﬂation rate
and their implied tools and concepts (e.g. loss functions) are thus not well suited to
analyze inﬂation and address issues of concerns for central banks.
When assessing the monetary policy stance, the discussion needs to somehow relate
an instrument on which central banks have a direct or indirect inﬂuence, such as a
movements.
9short-term interest rate or a monetary aggregate, to a target variable, e.g. inﬂation.
As monetary policy cannot be based mechanically on a speciﬁc model, central banks
look for diﬀerent relationships/frameworks linking the instrument to the target. To
avoid drifting away from a given inﬂation range or from a steady-state to another
steady-state, policymakers thus need to think in terms of where to set i in order to
attain a given target, and not merely deviations from target, which amounts to a
consideration of cyclical policy only. In addressing the drifting issue, central bankers
also want to have something more useful and practical than discussions on unstable
systems, indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria. Characterizing the 1970s period in
the US as an indeterminate equilibrium is of not much use for a central bank that
w a n t st or e a c ha n dr e m a i ni nag i v e ni n ﬂation range, whether it is 1-3 percent or
price stability, nor for an economist who wants to model inﬂa t i o ni nA r g e n t i n ao r
in some European countries in the pre-euro era. Therefore, we have to understand
the relationship between variables indirectly controlled by central banks and major
inﬂation developments.
We thus have to think in other terms than optimal rule coeﬃcients around steady-
states and need to compare observed interest rates to benchmarks with the aim of
reaching a certain (average) inﬂation rate. The analysis of this section shows that
thinking in terms of interest rates or Taylor rules fails to address those issues in a
satisfactory way, in contrast to the monetary analysis of section 3.
Figure 2 displays the US 3-month T-bill rate (TB3m) together with the Taylor rule
(Taylor) from equation (1) and the inﬂation rate π to which the real interest rate r∗
is added (Fisher)7. This latter variable corresponds to the Fisherian interest rate, i.e.
7Interest rates are 3-month rates. Potential output is real potential GDP (Congressional Budget
Oﬃce) for the US, HP ﬁltered real GDP for the euro area, and is derived from a production function
10r∗ +π,w h e r er∗is set equal to 2. Several interesting features appear from this graph.
An obvious fact that is often overlooked when discussing interest rules is that major
interest rates movements are driven by changes in inﬂation environments rather than
monetary policy reaction to the economy or policy stance. Higher interest rates during
the 1970s did not mean than monetary policy was more restrictive then than during
the 1990s; this merely represents the only clearly established relationship between
interest rates and inﬂation, i.e. the Fisher eﬀect. But, by examining interest rates,
what can we say about monetary policy stance and implied future inﬂation? What
information do interest rates convey for future inﬂation? Given the lack of theory and
empirical evidence, interpreting interest rate movements beyond the Fisher equality
becomes diﬃcult and, given the focus on around steady-state analysis, recent research
has not provided us with useful ways of thinking about it.
From Figure 2, the value added of Taylor rule over a Fisherian interest rate is not
clear. Intuitively, both variables should give a similar message: if the interest rate is
above (below) the Fisherian interest rate, i.e. if the real interest rate is above (below)
its equilibrium, inﬂation should decrease (increase). We can say then that monetary
policy was too loose in the 1970s, leading to an increasing inﬂation, and restrictive
in the 1980s, bringing inﬂation down. This interpretation is thus consistent with the
direction of inﬂation changes, but what indication do we get about inﬂation rates?
Thinking in terms of inﬂation rates is diﬃcult as interest rates are increasing func-
tions of inﬂation rates via both the Fisher eﬀect and the policy reaction function.
Moreover, an increase in average inﬂation is associated ﬁrst with low (policy induced)
interest rates but later with higher rates (due to the Fisher eﬀect). In other words,
as interest rates rise in a normalization period, for example, after a weak activ-
approach (SNB) for Switzerland.
11ity/inﬂation period and as the economy is strengthening, it is hard to distinguish
between an increase that is policy driven (i.e. a change “recommended” by the term
1.5(π − π∗)+0 .5(y − y∗)) and an increase that reﬂects a rise in steady-state (aver-
age) inﬂation. The latter case would be an unwelcome change in the variable π∗ in a
case where the policy target has eﬀectively not been changed. Diﬀerent models yield
diﬀerent results on where to set the interest rate in a given situation in order to reach
a given inﬂation level, and a wait-and-see approach with incremental steps (i.e. wait
and see how a certain interest rate change aﬀects the economy and inﬂation) carries
the risk of “being behind the curve” as there are lags in monetary policy eﬀects.
Evaluating the monetary policy stance content of a Taylor rule in a world when
inﬂation is not ﬂuctuating around a given steady-state level requires focusing attention
on the variable π∗ of equation (1). The value of π∗ originally used by Taylor (1993) and
used to compute the Taylor rule in Figure 2 is 2 percent. However, when comparing
the Taylor rule relative to the observed interest rate with realized inﬂa t i o n( w h i c ho n
F i g u r e2c o r r e s p o n d st ot h eF i s h e ri n t e r e s tr a t ev a r i a b l em i n u s2), we see that the
Taylor rule has been unsuccessful in delivering its own implied target. Over the 1980s
and 1990s, the actual 3-month T-bill rate has been consistently above the Taylor
rule rate associated with a 2 percent inﬂation. Despite that fact, inﬂation reached 2
percent only in the late 1990s and only for a few years if the CPI is considered. In
other words, inﬂation has almost always been above the implied target (2 percent)
without the actual interest rate being below the Taylor rule. There is thus not a useful
relationship between the implied inﬂation target and observed inﬂation. Moreover,
there is no indication why inﬂation should have picked up to 4 percent around 1990;
t h eT - b i l lr a t ew a se v e na b o v et h er u l ei m p l y i n g2 percent inﬂation before and during
12this inﬂation increase. Furthermore, we would have expected a strong decrease in
inﬂation following the high interest rate relative to the Taylor rule seen in the second
part of the 1990s. There is also no indication why inﬂation began to accelerate in
the mid-1960s, the beginning of the “great inﬂation”, when the T-bill rate was at
or above the Taylor rule just prior. And ﬁnally, in the 1970s, it is diﬃcult to assess
what inﬂation observed interest rates would have implied, given that they have been
consistently below the Taylor rule.
To assess the nominal anchor properties of a Taylor rule, i.e. what inﬂation we
could expect following a given observed interest rate, I plug the observed 3-month





t =2( πt + r
∗ − it)+πt +( yt − y
∗
t) (2)
with r∗ =2 . I then compare the implied target π∗
t to observed inﬂation. Figure
3 presents the implicit inﬂation target π∗
t (Implicit Target) together with observed
inﬂation (Inﬂation). Implied inﬂation was much higher than observed inﬂation during
the 1960s and 1970s and much lower during the disinﬂation period and in the 1980s
and 1990s. Consequently, measuring monetary policy stance with interest rate levels
does not give valuable information and guidance regarding subsequent inﬂation levels.
Moreover, the inﬂation objective, π∗
t,s u p p o s e dt op i nd o w n“ t r e n di n ﬂation” in New
Keynesian models, is not related to observed inﬂa t i o n . T h ef a c tt h a ti n t e r e s tr a t e
r u l e st h a ta r en o tr e l a t e dt oi n ﬂation objectives are describing monetary policy in
many models used for analysis or forecasting should be concerning.
13Similar issues arise when the “natural growth rule”, i.e.
∆i =0 .5(π − π
∗)+0 .5(∆y − ∆y
∗), (3)
discussed (in its forecast-based formulation) by Orphanides (2003) is used to evaluate
policy stance. The 3-month T-bill rate follows the rule relatively well over the 1980s
and 1990s while inﬂation was most of the time above target. This measure of stance
also missed the inﬂation increase of the late 1980s / early 1990s.
Orphanides argues that equation (3) is equivalent to a money growth rule. This
however is the case only under his particular assumption that velocity deviations
from equilibrium are a function of the interest rate. With a more conventional money
demand where velocity itself is a function of the interest rate, a money growth rule
implies that the change of the equilibrium nominal interest rate appears in equation
(3). Both money demand formulations are equivalent only in the case of constant
equilibrium nominal interest rate, which is not plausible with data characterized by
long-lasting inﬂation swings. Moreover, Orphanides disregards the change in the
money demand error term, arguing that short-term velocity ﬂuctuations are the sug-
gested drawback in considering money. The analysis of this paper, however, will
show that these short-term velocity ﬂuctuations contain additional information for
price developments that non-monetary analyses miss.
Swiss interest rates, i.e. the short-term (3-month LIBOR) as well as the Taylor
and Fisher rates, where r∗ is set to 1.2 (average over the past 3 decades) and π∗ is
set to 1, are presented in Figure 4. Since 2000 the Taylor rule and the actual interest
rate have evolved close to each other and inﬂation has ﬂuctuated around 1 percent.
However, such a rule fails to account for the loose policy stance preceding the two
14inﬂationary periods of the early 1980s and early 1990s and provides no quantitative
information of subsequent price levels during these episodes. Furthermore, the Taylor
rate is constantly and substantially below the actual interest rate during the 1990s
despite the fact that inﬂation was reduced to and remained around 1 percent. The
next section will show that, in contrast to the lack of information of interest rate
stance, money provides quantitative indications on subsequent price levels.
3. MONETARY AGGREGATES AND INFLATION
3.1. SOME MONETARY REGULARITIES
Money and the price level
This section presents stylized facts on the relationship between money and price
levels. The monetary variable considered is deﬁned as
m
∗





where c is a normalization (negative of a money demand estimated) constant, m is
the observed money level, y∗ is real potential output, β is an estimated interest rate
semi-elasticity of a real money demand equation where a unitary income elasticity
has been imposed, and i∗ is an HP ﬁltered short-term interest rate or opportunity
cost of money8. All variables except interest rates are in logarithms. Conceptual
8Monetary aggregates are M2- for the US, M2 for the euro area, and M2 for Switzerland. Some
results will also be presented with the euro area M3 aggregate adjusted by portfolio shifts, as the
ECB assigns an explicit role on that aggregate in its strategy. US M2- corresponds to M2 minus
small time deposits, and includes cash, demand and checking deposits, savings accounts, money
market deposit accounts, and retail money market funds. Euro area M2 includes currency, overnight
deposits, deposits with an agreed maturity up to 2 years, and deposits redeemable at a period of
15considerations underlying the computation of m∗ and the choice of monetary aggre-
gate are presented in Reynard (2006), thus only a brief description is provided in the
next paragraphs. Money demand estimates used for the required low-frequency level
adjustments are presented in the appendix.
I consider an asset as monetary if it yields an interest rate below the 3-month
rate and provides direct or indirect transaction services. An aggregate composed of
such assets is the most likely to exhibit a close and stable relationship to nominal
GDP. Moreover, such an aggregate gives the right monetary policy stance signal, i.e.
it increases when the policy rate decreases and vice versa, as interest rates paid on
transaction accounts are relatively sticky and move only with persistent changes in
the 3-month market rate. Broader monetary aggregates do not necessarily provide
with the right stance signal, as the additional assets included in them with yields at
or above the 3-month rate are positively correlated with the policy rate9.M o n e t a r y
aggregates deﬁned according to this transaction concept are characterized by an es-
timated unitary income elasticity, which is not the case of broader aggregates. The
latter aggregates are generally associated with an income elasticity above unity and
sample-dependent. My preferred approach regarding the choice of monetary aggre-
g a t ei sn o tt os w i t c hf r o mo n ea g g r e g a t et ot h eo t h e ra sa p p a r e n ti n s t a b i l i t yo c c u r s ,
notice up to 3 months. Euro area M3 consists of M2 plus debt securities up to 2 years, repurchase
agreements and money market funds. Swiss M2 includes cash, sight and savings deposits. The
interest rate used is the opportunity cost of money (3-month rate minus the weighted average of
rates paid on the diﬀerent monetary assets) when available, i.e. for US M2- and euro area M3, and
the 3-month rate otherwise, i.e. for Swiss and euro area M2.
9For the euro area, M2 does not exactly corresponds to my preferred concept, as it includes some
time deposits with maturity over 3 months. Moreover, it does not include money market funds,
contrary to M2- in the US. However, whether or not these latter assets are included does not matter
much empirically for money demand or the money/price relationship; issues arise mainly when
assets with yields close to checking or transaction accounts are not included, and/or if signiﬁcant
amounts of assets with yields above the 3-month interest rate are included. Euro area M3 contains
in addition debt securities, which are not related to the transaction concept, but M3 information
value for inﬂation is considered as its growth rate is an explicit element of the ECB strategy.
16but rather to choose an aggregate that is closely related to the transaction concept
and then identify and explain apparent aggregate instability episodes. The aggregates
chosen in this paper have been stable over the sample periods considered, except for
two episodes in the US case where aggregate instability is clearly related to changes
in extensive margins of money demand10.
The money level considered has been adjusted by potential output and equilibrium
velocity, i.e. by low-frequency changes in the opportunity cost of money, where the
estimated long run interest rate semi-elasticity of money demand is used to make
the adjustment. The latter protracted cost-driven changes in money holdings, or
equilibrium velocity movements, reﬂect mainly changes in inﬂationary environments,
i.e. Fisher eﬀects, but could also reﬂect real equilibrium interest rate changes. For
example, during a disinﬂation, the inﬂation rate decreases by more than the money
growth rate, as interest rates decrease. Given this negative correlation between money
growth and interest rates, not accounting for equilibrium interest rate movements bi-
ases econometric results in the forms of less than one-to-one and often non-signiﬁcant
relationships between money growth and inﬂation found in the literature11.H o w -
ever, adjusting money growth for equilibrium velocity changes results in signiﬁcant
estimated dynamic relationships between money growth and subsequent inﬂation in
various VAR speciﬁcations, using US and euro area data, and in a one-to-one low fre-
quency relationship. It is an empirical issue of drawing the line between low-frequency
cost-driven adjustments and policy-induced liquidity eﬀects aﬀecting subsequent price
10Changes in extensive margins are measured by changes in ﬁnancial market participation, i.e. in
the fraction of households holding non-monetary assets, like e.g. stocks or bonds, as part of their
portfolio. An increase in that fraction means that some households that were holding only monetary
assets decide to invest part of their ﬁnancial wealth in non-monetary assets, thus aﬀecting money
demand via the extensive margins. For more details on the measurement, causes and eﬀects of
extensive margins changes, see Reynard (2004).
11See e.g. Friedman and Kuttner (1992) or De Grauwe and Polan (2005).
17developments, but empirical analysis shows that an HP ﬁlter adjustment is well suited
to distinguish between these two eﬀects. Moreover, the analysis below is not signiﬁ-
cantly aﬀected if a backward-looking ﬁlter, like the ﬁlter proposed by Cogley (2002), is
used instead of the HP ﬁlter, thus the equilibrium velocity adjustment can be applied
in real time.
The output adjustment ensures that if money and potential output oﬀset each other,
no inﬂuence on prices follows. I use a unitary income elasticity, a result that clearly
appears from the data when changes in extensive margins (US) and sample issues
(related to the euro area disinﬂation) as well as the choice of monetary aggregate are
correctly dealt with.
The deﬁnition of m∗ is equivalent to the variable labeled p∗ in P*-models, initially
presented by Hallman, Porter and Small (1991), and the diﬀerence between m∗ and
the actual price level, i.e. m∗
t − pt, corresponds to a measure of excess liquidity
used, for example, in analyses of monetary developments by Fed, ECB and SNB
economists (see e.g. Orphanides and Porter (2001), Masuch, Pill and Willeke (2001),
and Peytrignet and Reynard (2004)): using equation (4), the diﬀerence between m∗
t
and pt can be expressed as
m
∗
t − pt = mt − b mt, (5)
where b mt is the money demand that would prevail at equilibrium output and interest
rate, given the current price level, i.e.





The diﬀerence between m∗
t and pt thus represents a measure of excess liquidity, i.e.
18money in excess of an estimated long run equilibrium money demand. The interpre-
tation of money and price developments in this paper however diﬀers from P*-models
interpretation of excess liquidity and its relationship to inﬂation. The relative devel-
opments of the variables considered, and thus excess liquidity measures, diﬀer as well
given diﬀerent treatments of equilibrium velocity and in some instances a diﬀerent
choice of monetary aggregate concept. These diﬀerences will be discussed below.
In the analysis of this paper, monetary aggregates represent a “quantity-side” mea-
sure of monetary conditions induced by monetary policy, a terminology used in Nelson
(2003, p.1043), in the sense that money movements implicitly — i.e. given the oper-
ating procedure and regime — represent monetary policy exogenous shocks as well as
endogenous reactions to various variables and shocks.
To illustrate the eﬀect of the equilibrium velocity adjustment, consider Figure 5,
which displays both the velocity adjusted (M∗, i.e. c+mt−y∗
t +βi∗
t) and non-velocity-
adjusted (M, i.e. c+mt−y∗
t) money levels for the US, together with the price level (P).
People held relatively fewer real money balances as inﬂation increased in the 1960s and
1970s, and relatively more real money balances as inﬂation decreased in the 1980s
and 1990s. Not accounting for these low-frequency money demand Fisherian level
eﬀects blurs the money/price relationship. As only the low-frequency (HP ﬁltered)
movements of interest rates are removed, the liquidity or monetary policy driven
eﬀects on money remain, as it will become clear from the analysis below. The US
m o n e t a r ya g g r e g a t ei si na d d i t i o na d j u s t e db ya nu p w a r dv e l o c i t ys h i f ti nm o n e y
demand due to a change in money demand extensive margins which occurred from
the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, as described in Reynard (2004), as well as for a
downward velocity shift between 2001 and 2003. A discussion of these additional
19adjustments is provided in the appendix.
Figures 5-8 present the evolution of monetary aggregate (M∗)a n dp r i c e( P) levels
for the US, the euro area with my preferred measure M2 as well as the oﬃcial aggregate
M3 adjusted for portfolio shifts by ECB staﬀ12, and Switzerland. These observed
reduced-form relationships between money and prices can be characterized as follows.
When m∗
t > pt, increases in money levels are followed by proportional increases in
price levels. However, the lag before prices start reacting to a relatively faster money
increase is time-varying, and the upward price adjustment pace or period length is
also time-varying. As a result of these time-varying adjustment periods, the overall
increase in the price level from its initial level could be approximately characterized
as proportional to the corresponding preceding money increase in addition to the
price increase that occurred during the lag period; moreover, the inﬂation rate during
the adjustment may not exactly match the preceding money growth rate. This latter
adjustment seems to be faster in high than in low inﬂation environments, i.e. inﬂation
rates usually match closely previous money growth rates when inﬂation is high, like in
the 1970s, but are lower otherwise. When the money growth rate decreases or when
m∗
t <p t,t h ei n ﬂation rate decreases; whether money levels increase or decrease while
m∗
t <p t does not seem to aﬀect price developments in diﬀerent ways. Thus m∗ draws
the price level upwards, but a decreasing or relatively low money level with respect
to prices causes only the inﬂation rate to decrease.
This evolution of the price level can be expressed in a quantity theoretic way,
i.e. according to the evolution of the money level m∗, with some additional stylized
facts, as follows. A higher money level relative to the price level (i.e. m∗
t >p t)i s
12M3 adjusted by portfolio shifts is the result of ECB analyses that have tried to account in real
time for the particular ﬁnancial market developments which occurred in between 2001 and 2003 (see
ECB, 2004). This series has been computed back to 1980 only.
20followed, with a time-varying lag and pace, by a proportional increase in the price
level. Consider ﬁrst the Swiss case in Figure 8. Inﬂation was relatively low in the
late-1970s and mid-1980s preceding the two major money increases — relative to the
price level, i.e. with m∗
t >p t — that started in 1977 and 1986 respectively, and the
price levels around 1982 and 1993 ended up, after a relatively faster increase, at a level
close to the money level peaks of 1979 and 1988 respectively. The relative inﬂation
increases of the mid-1980s and late 1990s can be characterized in a similar way.
In the US, as displayed in Figure 5, relatively faster increases in the money level
preceded the beginning of the “great inﬂation” as well as each inﬂation peak of the
1970s, i.e. the peaks of around 1970, 1975 and 1980. During each of these increases,
the inﬂation rate approximately matches the preceding money growth rate. Com-
pared to Swiss data, the price level following the late 1970s money increase ended
up relatively higher as the price increase during the lag period was stronger. Two
episodes of relatively high money levels occurred after the early 1980s disinﬂation
period, starting around 1986 and 1998, and were followed by corresponding upward
p r i c ea d j u s t m e n t si nt h el a t e1 9 8 0 sa n di nt h er e c e n tp e r i o d .
Similarly, in the euro area, as displayed in Figures 6 and 7, relatively higher money
levels starting in the late 1970s and late 1980s were followed by corresponding upward
price adjustments13. In the euro area case, inﬂation follows so closely money growth,
as can be seen on Figure 9, that it is diﬃcult to distinguish relative level movements
graphically14.
An important fact however is that no downward movement in the price level has
13Similar results are obtained if income elasticity is not constrained to unity, as in ECB money
demand speciﬁcations.
14The discrepancy between money growth and inﬂation rates since the mid-1990s is due to a
relatively lower money level and asymetric prices behavior, as discussed in the next paragraph.
21been observed in the samples considered. A money level decline is thus not followed
by a decline in the price level. After prices have adjusted to a relatively higher money
level, prices do not adjust downwards to m∗
t if the latter is below prices. Rather than
observing a decline in prices as the money level decreases or as the money growth
rate declines, we observe a decrease in the inﬂation rate. The fact that a distinction
h a st ob em a d eb e t w e e nt h ec a s e sm∗
t >p t or m∗
t <p t regarding whether an increase
in money is followed by a proportional increase in prices or no movements at all thus
seems to be due to an asymmetric price behavior, which could be caused by various
frictions.
Even if this analysis does not allow to distinguish between endogenous versus ex-
ogenous monetary movements, the only times when it is the price level that appears
to lead the money level, rather than vice versa, are during disinﬂation periods — which
however have been preceded by monetary contractions. This fact, particularly appar-
ent with US data in the early 1980s and with Swiss data in the early 1980s and early
1990s, has already been pointed out for end of hyperinﬂation episodes by Sargent
(1993) and is well illustrated in King (2002), who displays money and price level time
series for a few hyperinﬂation episodes15. It is important to notice that real money
balances adjust upward only after the inﬂation rate has decreased. In these episodes,
the money level reaches the price level from below. This is most probably money
demand which adjusts to the new price level, as it is diﬃcult to think of monetary
authority deliberately adjusting money to a given price level.
15See King’s chart 5. However, on that chart, disinﬂations are not preceded by monetary contrac-
tions. I suspect that this is due to not accounting for equilibrium velocity changes.
22Short run velocity, output gaps, and monetary policy lags
This sub-section discusses the role of short run velocity and output gaps in the
monetary policy transmission process, and relates ﬁndings to mainstream ways of
modeling inﬂation and to some critiques and misconceptions regarding the role of
money in the monetary policy transmission process.
First, consider equation
mt = −c + pt + yt − βit + εt, (7)
where εt corresponds to the residual of a cointegrating relationship between these
variables, usually interpreted as a real money demand equation where a unitary in-
come elasticity has been imposed; εt is what is usually referred to as “velocity shock”,
i.e. money movements not associated with contemporaneous interest rate or output
ﬂuctuations, and usually ignored in present days models. In terms of the quantity
equation, βit + εt represents the velocity of money; β (i∗
t − it)+εt represents devi-
ations from equilibrium velocity or short-term velocity movements, and β (i∗
t − it)
can be interpreted as money movements reﬂecting contemporaneous policy-induced
interest rate movements16.Iw i l lr e f e rt oεt as the velocity residual.
W ec a nt h e nd e c o m p o s et h ed i ﬀerence between the adjusted money level m∗ and
prices in three diﬀerent parts,
m
∗




t − it)+εt, (8)
16Note that even when it represents the opportunity cost of money instead of the 3-month rate,
(i∗
t − it) can still be interpreted as policy-induced interest rate movements as own rates paid on
deposits are sticky and vary only with persistent changes in market interest rates.
23i.e. an output gap, an interest rate gap, and a velocity residual17.T h u s ,t h ed i ﬀerence
m∗
t − pt represents the sum of output gaps and deviations from equilibrium velocity.
Let us further deﬁne
p
y
t ≡ pt +( yt − y
∗
t). (9)




Figures 10-12 plot the variable py (Py) together with m∗and p, for the US, the
euro area (where the sample has been restricted to 1978-1992 for graphical clarity)
and Switzerland, respectively. The information of output gaps for inﬂation is illus-
trated with the variable py, which can also be interpreted as the price level that would
have prevailed in the absence of frictions that caused real quantity adjustments. The
output gap thus corresponds to p
y
t − pt. We observe that output gap ﬂuctuations
sometimes provide slightly advanced information on price developments, sometimes
move contemporaneously with prices, but sometimes prices start increasing before a
positive output gap appears and keeps increasing after the positive output gap has
vanished. This indicates that major price developments, even persistent ones, are
not always associated with real quantity adjustments. However, short-term veloc-
ity movements, i.e. the spread between m∗and py, display a much more leading,
quantitative, and thus more consistent relationship with price developments.
The regularity in the sequence of events is striking. First, the money level in-
creases/decreases above/below the price level, then the output gap turns positive/negative,
and then prices adjust. These facts do not ﬁt well with forward-looking New Key-
17It is standard in the P*-literature to decompose the diﬀerence between actual and equilibrium
money balances, i.e. excess liquidity, in three gaps, and to interpret these gaps as causal factors for
inﬂation. This interpretation is however problematic given the observed lead-lag relationship running
from velocity to output gap movements, i.e. these diﬀerent gaps do not seem to be independent
from each others.
24nesian frameworks where inﬂation is a function of future output gaps, nor with the
claim that correlations between money growth and real activity have broken down at
business cycle frequencies since the 1980s18.
Inﬂation persistence, in the sense of substantial long-lasting inﬂation swings, thus
reﬂects money growth persistence, which occurs much before output gap movements.
We observe that there is ﬁrst no eﬀect on inﬂation, and then price increases reﬂect
closely past money increases. This adjustment pattern does not seem to ﬁtw e l l
with an optimal staggered price setting framework. The lag preceding real quantity
adjustments could be understood in terms of a liquidity eﬀect or a money demand
framework as in Alvarez et al. (2003). However, as discussed below, not only interest
rate induced velocity movements but also velocity residuals are responsible for the
lag. This means that a framework where velocity is driven by interest rates only is
incomplete.
Figures 13-15 display interest rate gaps, i.e. β (i∗
t − it), velocity residuals, i.e. εt,
and excess liquidity, i.e. m∗
t − pt. The correlation between velocity residuals and
excess liquidity is 0.77 for US data, 0.91 for euro area data, and 0.78 for Swiss data.
Correlations between interest rate gaps and excess liquidity are positive but lower,
i.e. 0.39 for the US, 0.01 for the euro area, and 0.42 for Switzerland, and correlations
between interest gaps and velocity residuals are negative, i.e. -0.14 for the US, -0.30
for the euro area, and -0.21 in the Swiss case.
What is usually labelled as velocity “shock” and omitted from monetary policy
models thus represents an important part of monetary movements and, as show above,
these movements have useful quantitative information for price movements, with a
substantial lead relative to output gap movements. A plausible interpretation of these
18See e.g. Woodford (2006, p.16), who refers to Friedman and Kuttner (1992) and Walsh (2003).
25velocity residuals could be that, contrary to what is usually modeled, the eﬀects
of monetary policy cannot be summarized by short-term interest rates only, and
these persistent residuals could reﬂect propagation mechanisms induced by ﬁnancial
frictions.
Nelson (2003) argues that monetary aggregates could act as proxy for various yields
not considered in standard macroeconomic models. Figure 16 display the negative of
the US velocity residual, i.e. an abnormally low money level not associated with 3-
month interest rate or output movements corresponds to the line being above zero and
vice versa, together with bonds average (across 2 to 5-year maturity) ex-post excess
returns from Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). The latter variable represents one-year
excess returns, i.e. borrowing at the one-year rate, buying a long-term bond, and
selling it in one year. The evolution of both series display interesting similarities, and
velocity residuals often lead excess returns; this of course does not say anything about
causality. Correlation coeﬃcients are 0.25 for contemporaneous movements and 0.4
when velocity residuals are lagged by 3 quarters.
A relationship between these variables could be interpreted in the sense that restric-
tive/expansive monetary policy, in terms of money supply or money as a quantitative
measure of monetary conditions, aﬀects various yields and increases/decreases risk
premia, i.e. induces higher/lower longer-term yields that are however followed by rel-
atively lower/higher inﬂation. Another interpretation could be that money demand
reacts to additional yields than short-term yields. Both interpretations would pro-
vide an information role for money with respect to the monetary policy transmission
mechanism.
The evidence presented above on the behavior of velocity and velocity residuals
26allows us to address two points raised by critiques of the usefulness of considering
monetary aggregates in monetary policy. First, it is generally argued that velocity
shocks weaken the information content of money for price developments. This views
is related to Poole’s (1970) insight that in the presence of relatively large money
demand shocks, monetary policy should accommodate these shocks. This accommo-
dation should reduce output and price ﬂuctuations as these shocks are assumed to
have no inﬂuence on inﬂation or economic activity in contrast to the interest rate
movements the shocks would generate if not accommodated. As a result, the link
between money and prices, it is argued, should weaken given large velocity residuals.
The misconception underlying this critique is due to the assumption that monetary
policy is transmitted via short-term interest rates only. Oﬀsetting the velocity move-
ments, i.e. holding interest rates ﬁxed and letting money ﬂuctuate, would in that
world lead to less price (and maybe output) ﬂuctuations. The analysis above has
shown that, on the contrary, velocity residuals contain important information for
subsequent price and potentially real activity developments, and signiﬁcant money
movements are always followed by corresponding price movements.
The other criticism is that if money is used to oﬀset other fundamental economic
shocks with respect to price developments, the observed relationship between money
and prices would vanish. Velocity residuals would this time be interpreted as money
oﬀsetting other fundamental shocks. However, if these other fundamental shocks
would have been important for price developments in the samples considered, we
would have observed either signiﬁcant price movements not related to monetary move-
ments if central banks had not used monetary aggregates to oﬀset them, or we would
have observed signiﬁcant money movements not followed by inﬂa t i o ni nc a s ec e n t r a l
27banks had used money to oﬀset these shocks. Accounting for price behavior asymme-
try, we have however observed neither fact, thus these other fundamental shocks seems
relatively small. The fact that downward money level movements are not followed by
downward price movements could be interpreted as money oﬀsetting positive price
shocks; this interpretation is however less plausible than downward nominal rigidities,
especially given that monetary contractions occurred usually in disinﬂationary policy
periods. There is thus no empirical reason, at least in the economies considered and
subject to similar shocks, to think that the information of money for a central bank
that perfectly meets its inﬂation target would vanish. The inﬂation rate in this case
would match the money growth rate.
The monetary regularities presented above also help to understand why many em-
pirical studies have not found a signiﬁcant relationship between money growth and
subsequent inﬂation, and point to several issues in modeling money. First, there is
a long lag between money developments and corresponding subsequent price move-
ments and output ﬂuctuations. It is thus not surprising that researchers who have
included only a few quarterly lags of money growth have claimed that money does
not help in explaining or forecasting inﬂation relative to output gaps or other real
variables moving more or less contemporaneously with inﬂation, although the latter
variables provide only with a delayed and incomplete signal. The P* approach, which
has usually found supporting evidence for money, suﬀers from a similar problem,
as it assumes that excess liquidity triggers an inﬂation adjustment as a function of
contemporaneous excess liquidity as long as this liquidity, or money demand disequi-
librium, persists. In fact, given the lags, we observe that the price adjustment often
occurs well after the money demand disequilibrium has vanished and even as excess
28liquidity has changed sign19,a n dt h a tp e a ki n ﬂation does not correspond to peak
excess liquidity; moreover, empirically, the price level adjustment eventually matches
the previous money level increase. Focusing on such an error-correction mechanism
has another drawback in that ad hoc assumptions on inﬂation trends have to be
made. Inﬂation adjustment speciﬁcations are usually of the accelerationist type, like
e.g. in Hallman, Porter and Small (1991), where a higher money level generates
an increase in trend inﬂation rather than an increase in the price level, inducing a
price level overshooting and oscillating inﬂation behavior, or the analysis focuses on
inﬂation deviations around an exogenously speciﬁed trend, like e.g. in Gerlach and
Svensson (2003) where a downward inﬂation trend reﬂecting central banks assumed
objective is modeled. An additional complication, which aﬀects models including or
not money, comes from the asymmetric price behavior, which might bias standard
linear estimates. Finally, monetary movements due to equilibrium velocity changes
need to be accounted for and not interpreted as signals of subsequent corresponding
price movements.
3.2. MONEY AND POLICY STANCE
A useful measure of monetary policy stance should give qualitative and quantita-
tive information on subsequent inﬂa t i o nt r e n d sa sw e l la so nﬂuctuations around these
trends. I have argued in section 2 that interest rate stance measures do not provide
19This is, for example, one element that lead Christiano (1989) to criticize P*-models, based on
their prediction regarding the late 1970s US episode, as inﬂation increased despite an excess liquidity
that was small and even turned negative. Moreover, using M2 does not display as a clear monetary
impulse as with M2- preceding the inﬂation peak around 1980; M2 is less useful than M2- in general
as a measure of policy stance, as the amount of some assets included in M2, like e.g. certiﬁcates
of deposits, usually increases with policy rate increases, and vice versa, given that the own rate is
above the 3-month rate.
29such information. The analysis above shows that monetary movements precede and
validate changes in inﬂationary environments, on the upside as well as on the down-
side, as well as transitory inﬂation ﬂuctuations, and provide quantitative information
on subsequent price levels, with price levels adjusting proportionally to relatively
higher money levels. Monetary developments preceded, validated and provided with
the successive impulses of the “great inﬂation” of the 1970s in the US and in the euro
area, with quantitative information on inﬂation average and ﬂuctuations. Monetary
developments can similarly explain the disinﬂation and the lower inﬂation average of
the 1980s and 1990s, as well as provide qualitative and quantitative information on
t h el a t e1 9 8 0 si n ﬂation increases.
With “trend inﬂation” determined exogenously and money demand relegated to
models’ backgrounds, New Keynesian models imply no role for money in monetary
policy. For example, Woodford (2006), using a model where “trend inﬂation” is
speciﬁed as a random walk, claims that “[o]ne does not need to monitor money
growth to tell if an undesirable long-run inﬂation trend is developing; measurement
of inﬂation itself suﬃces for this” (p.21), arguing that the long-term relationship
between money growth and inﬂation is not useful to guarantee a certain inﬂation
average. Furthermore, he argues that “[w]hat one needs as additional regressors [than
current inﬂa t i o ni ni n ﬂation forecast equations] are stationary variables that are highly
correlated with the current departure of inﬂation from its stochastic trend”(p.27).
The evidence provided in this paper shows that money developments allow us to
think in terms of inﬂation steady-states, transitions from/to a diﬀerent steady-state,
“trend inﬂation”, and temporary ﬂuctuations around “trend inﬂation”; the notions of
steady-state or “trend inﬂation” in fact become useless. Money provides an advanced
30signal of inﬂation developments, with respect to trends as well as ﬂuctuations around
trends. Policymakers aiming at keeping inﬂation below a certain threshold cannot
aﬀord to wait and observe inﬂation picking up before acting, given the monetary
policy lags.
The danger of persistently deviating or drifting away from low inﬂation thus arises
when monetary policy allows money to accommodate price increases following an ini-
tial monetary expansion, with a persistently relatively steep money slope as in the
1970s in the US and euro area for example, rather than restricting liquidity until
inﬂation drops. The fundamental observation is that the high inﬂation environment
of the 1970s in the US and euro area is characterized by relatively steeper money level
trends, with money leading inﬂation. In Switzerland in contrast, monetary policy has
not accommodated price increases, i.e. it has reacted restrictively to relatively faster
increases in prices, thus average inﬂation has remained low relative to other coun-
tries20. If only the level of money is or has been higher, but is not increasing faster,
the subsequent relatively faster price level increase is temporary. The rate of price
increase in this latter case should depend on time-varying frictions and expectations,
and has been higher in high inﬂation environments.
In the samples considered, we do not observe a signiﬁcant increase in inﬂation that
has not been preceded by a corresponding increase in money growth, and we do not
observe a signiﬁcant relatively higher money level not followed by corresponding price
level increases. Given the substantial information provided by short-term velocity
movements, the implied low quantitative eﬀects of other fundamental shocks, and
the fact that velocity movements provide leading information for subsequent price
20The Swiss National Bank had money growth targets from 1973 to 1999, although it was targeting
the monetary base or M1, but not M2, which is presented here.
31developments not always associated with interest rate or real output measures, using
monetary aggregates to measure policy stance and to guide policy decisions should
reduce inﬂation volatility and still result in a one-to-one relationship between money
growth and inﬂation.
4. MONETARY ANALYSIS AND APPARENT CHANGES IN INFLA-
TION DYNAMICS
Several issues have recently emerged regarding inﬂation dynamics. On one hand,
inﬂation is perceived to have been less persistent and less volatile since the mid-1980s
than in the 1970s. On the other hand, it has been argued that inﬂation has become
more diﬃcult to predict, in the sense that estimated coeﬃcients on unemployment or
real activity in inﬂation equations have declined in absolute value and Phillips curves
do not seem to provide additional forecasting information relative to univariate inﬂa-
tion equations. In other words, the Phillips curve has ﬂattened and the relationship
seems less precise. This section tries to shed light on these issues using the monetary
analysis presented above.
The standard Phillips curve can be represented as


















represent output gaps, forward looking in stan-
dard New-Keynesian models but mostly estimated in its backward looking form, and
st represents what is usually referred to as a supply shock.
Aﬁrst issue in using equation (10) to describe and forecast inﬂation dynamics is that
monetary aggregates and velocity developments provide leading information relative
32to output gaps for price developments. This means that forecasts generated with
Phillips curves signal inﬂation increases only with a delay. The estimation problem
can however not be solved by adding a few quarterly lags of money growth. Money can
lead price developments by several years and there is no reason to expect a ﬁxed lag
structure, thus estimates would be unprecise and unstable. Moreover, monetary and
output gap movements may not be independent from each other, as the information
value of output gaps for price movements appears to be already included in previous
monetary movements, thus estimates would be biased.
The observation that the Phillips curve has ﬂattened and inﬂation has become more
diﬃcult to forecast, or in other terms that the coeﬃcients γ’s have become smaller
and less precisely estimated, could be related to the fact that, as discussed above,
we observe both downward price rigidity in general and money levels that have been
mostly below price levels in the 1990s, which as a stylized fact has been associated
with a decline in inﬂation regardless of the direction of monetary and output gaps
movements. Thus the fewer and less persistent positive monetary impulses, i.e. excess
liquidity episodes, of the 1980s and 1990s relative to the 1970s could explain the lower
output gap coeﬃcients and the decline in inﬂation volatility of the post-1980 period,
a sw e l la st h ef a c tt h a ti n ﬂation has been below Phillips curves forecasts since the
late 1990s.
T h ed e c l i n ei ni n ﬂation persistence could be related to other facts discussed above,
which should also aﬀect the estimated coeﬃcients of equation (10). The fact that
monetary developments seem to feed into prices without always being associated
with corresponding output gap movements suggests that Phillips curves estimates
m i g h tb eb i a s e da n ds a m p l e - d e p e n d a n ta sd i ﬀerent monetary experiences could aﬀect
33the error term st diﬀerently. For example, the 1970s in the US was characterized by
several strong and persistent positive monetary impulses leading to higher inﬂation.
In the 1980s and 1990s in contrast, we have observed only one period of moderate
excess liquidity, i.e. in the late 1980s, followed by a small increase in inﬂation. As
some monetary impulses feed into prices without corresponding output gaps move-
ments, using equation (10) the high inﬂationary environment of the 1970s can be
characterized by an estimated higher inﬂation persistence that the 1980s and 1990s,
i.e. the inﬂation persistence of the 1970s can get attributed to some intrinsic inﬂa-
tion persistence instead of policy persistence reﬂected by monetary movements. The
apparent higher inﬂation persistence of the 1970s could thus be due to both more
positive monetary impulses and a higher inﬂationary environment, as a less credible
monetary policy might induce fewer real quantity adjustments and feed more directly
through prices.









at zero over business cycles, α equals average money growth over the estimation period








ρ =1 , which is the speciﬁcation generally used to model US inﬂation dynamics. This
raises another estimation issue; as inﬂation average or inﬂation average rate of change
depends on the sample considered, so does the estimated α. In other words, adding a
business cycle with a lower average inﬂation can change inﬂation dynamics, i.e. the
a v e r a g er a t eo fc h a n g ei ni n ﬂation α,t h u sa ﬀecting γ’s coeﬃcients on output gaps
as well as inﬂation (or its rate of change) implied convergence value in forecasting
exercises. This would be the case, for example, when adding the US post-1980 period
to a post-war sample if the Phillips curve has indeed ﬂattened recently, i.e. if similar
34output gap ﬂuctuations are associated with a lower inﬂation average.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Recently, theoretical as well as empirical models have been based on steady-state
normalization or detrended data, disregarding the only variable clearly related to
major movements of the general price level, i.e. money. This focus on relative price
analysis has had a strong inﬂuence on recent arguments and debates regarding inﬂa-
tion developments and prospects. One example is the discussion on global factors,
like international competitiveness and energy prices, as explanations of inﬂation de-
velopments. The increased global importance of the Chinese economy has often been
mentioned as a cause of holding inﬂation down in the early 2000s, and a few years
later as a cause of rising inﬂationary pressures.
In order to reconcile current models with major inﬂation ﬂuctuations, research has
been focusing on indeterminacy issues or has attributed these ﬂuctuations to inﬂation
objective changes, without empirical support. However, signiﬁcant price movements
can always be related to previous corresponding monetary developments, and signif-
icant monetary movements are always followed by corresponding price movements.
Using monetary aggregates is not straightforward and requires careful analysis, as
aggregate money demand instability can occur, and it is certainly wise to base mone-
tary policy decisions on a broad source of indicators and models and to communicate
in terms of an inﬂation objective. However, given the evidence presented, neglecting
money, i.e. relegating it to models’ backgrounds, and opposing using the evidence
to improve models and policy making is certainly not the best way of making the
best use of all available information, nor of improving our understanding of inﬂation
35dynamics and avoiding major policy mistakes.
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39APPENDIX: MONEY DEMAND
Figures 17-19 display velocity and opportunity cost for the US, the euro area
and Switzerland, respectively. As presented in Reynard (2006), using dynamic least
squares (Stock and Watson, 1993), an income elasticity not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from unity is found with US and euro area data, once changes in US ﬁnancial market
participation in the 1970s and checking accounts substitutes introduced in the early
1980s are accounted for, and when the euro area sample includes the 1970s, and Swiss
data can be characterized by a unitary income elasticity as well; this elasticity is thus
imposed in the three (groups of) economies21. Table 1 shows the corresponding in-
terest rate semi-elasticity, β, estimated by OLS. Similar results are obtained with
dynamic least squares regressions. The resulting error term is not used for inference,
but as a measure of money movements not associated with contemporaneous interest
rate or output ﬂuctuations, referred to as “velocity residuals” in the text. Table 1
also includes the euro area M3 adjusted by portfolio shifts. Sample periods are chosen
according to data availability.
β Sample
US M2- 3.08 1959Q1-2006Q2
Euro Area M2 1.22 1973Q1-2005Q4
Euro Area adjusted M3 3.66 1980Q1-2005Q4
Swiss M2 3.89 1975Q1-2006Q2
Table 1. Interest Rate Semi-Elasticity Estimates
In the US case, two broken trends in real money demand are estimated and used
to adjust the monetary variable m∗ in order to account for two distinct aggregate
21Reynard (2006) presents money demand results using a log-log instead of a semi-log speciﬁcation.
T h ea n a l y s i si sn o ts i g n i ﬁcantly aﬀected by this speciﬁcation choice. However, a semi-log speciﬁcation
seems more appropriate given recent US money demand developments.
40instability episodes. One trend covers the period 1965Q1-1977Q1 to account for the
change in money demand extensive margins due to the increase in ﬁnancial market
participation, i.e. an increase in the fraction of US households holding non-monetary
assets like e.g. stocks and bonds, that occurred during that period, as documented in
Reynard (2004). The other trend covers the period 2001Q1-2003Q1, where another
apparent aggregate instability occurred, also related to extensive margins. Between
the 2001 and 2004 Surveys of Consumer Finances22, ﬁnancial market participation
decrease from over 40 percent to about 35 percent; this is the ﬁrst time such a signiﬁ-
cant decrease in ﬁnancial market participation happens since these surveys started in
1962, and this could be related to the decline in equity markets prices. While these
trend adjustments are relatively ad hoc, they yield plausible outcomes. However,
more work is needed to quantify these changes in extensive margins in real time.
Practical examples of dealing with velocity shifts in real-time include Orphanides
and Porter (2000), who suggest using regression trees to account for real time ve-
locity shifts, and the analysis presented by ECB staﬀ to account for the 2001-2003
episode, adjusting the monetary aggregate M3 with measured portfolio shifts23;t h i s
latter adjusted monetary aggregate is displayed in Figure 7.
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Fig. 19. Swiss Money Demand
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